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CONTRACT STORIES: IMPORTANCE OF THE
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO LAW
Larry A. DiMatteo*
[A] right text . . . should be a standing introduction. It should be
simple. It should seem to lie open to a student who has never met
the law, and give him a footing. He need not fully understand it
all, or any of it; but out of each page, each sentence, he should
get enough to carry him along, and what he gets should be
accurate enough to help him in his work.
—Karl N. Llewellyn 1
[M]uch more important things have commonly been left out of
the case-book by the [author] than are left in it for the instructor
to leave out.
—Karl N. Llewellyn 2
INTRODUCTION
How law is taught is at the center of the debate over the need to
change legal education to better prepare students for a difficult and
changing marketplace for legal services. This Article analyzes the
benefits of using “stories” to teach law. The stories to be discussed relate
to contract law: this Article asks whether they can be used to improve
the method and content of teaching law. The ruminations offered on
teaching contract law, however, are also relevant to teaching other core,
first-year law courses.
The use of contract stories to bring contracts alive, and to better tie
theory to practice, is based upon the power of narrativity and
contextualism to deepen the understanding beyond doctrinal analysis.
The narrative approach to teaching law is at its best when it is highly
* Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law, Warrington College of Business Administration; Affiliate
Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 7 (Oceana Publ’ns
1960) (1930) (emphasis in original).
2. Id. at 95.
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contextualized—including contextual facts of a case (recognized facts);
context of the law of precedent as a story of legal development; law
creation within context of a particular cultural, economic, and social era;
and those elements of case context that are left unrecognized, but likely
influence party behavior and conduct (e.g., bias, discrimination). This
Article will discuss these different contextual factors in relationship to
the narrative approach to teaching law. This broad view of contextualism
will show how narrativity not only descriptively conveys the law, but
also will show the normative role of law in society and how law can be
reformed to enhance that normative role.
Contract law is the quintessential first-year law school course, often
taught by the Socratic method of teaching. It introduces students to the
doctrinal nature of law—as a series of fixed rules, principles, and
standards. The rules-based nature of contracts allows the Socratic stiletto
to parse from rule to exception and to exception to exceptions. However,
the true Socratic teaching of law no longer holds a dominative perch in
law schools, as it did some twenty or thirty years ago. It was a cherished
experience when used by my contract law professor, Robert S.
Summers, of Cornell Law School. But, alas, even by the second
semester of the first year its ability to rivet student attention began to
wane. In the end, most of my professors morphed into a lecturediscussion format. The educational benefits of a hard Socratic method of
teaching are debatable and whether it is the most efficient method of
teaching deductive and analogical reasoning is suspect. 3 In the end, it
may be efficient in the hands of a truly gifted Socratic teacher as
opposed to the lazy, but brilliant, mind able to raise queries with no premediated path in sight. But, even in the hands of a Socratic master, it can
be argued that it is a time consuming approach in which the richness of a
case cannot be completely exploited. The complexity of modern contract
transactions may require a different approach.
The different approach will still be a case-based approach, but one in
which the case is the basis of a story—a story connecting iconic case law
with modern cases that emphasize the continuity of law, as well as its
inherent flexibility. This flexibility allows the law to respond to novel
contract disputes. However, often what may seem novel may not be that
novel after all. Thus, the tying of cases from different eras of the law
into a narrative leads to a greater understanding of the dynamic nature of
law.

3. See J. T. Dillon, Paper Chase and the Socratic Method of Teaching, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529
(1980).
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This Article examines Lawrence Cunningham’s use of “contract
stories” in his innovative book, Contracts in the Real World: Stories of
Popular Contracts and Why They Matter (Contracts in the Real World),4
to flesh out the importance of narrative and context for understanding
law and its application to real world disputes. Part II provides some
initial observations of the Socratic and narrative approaches to teaching
law and reviews the structure of the law school casebook and the need to
develop a modern legal textbook that uses cases to weave a narrative of
the development of legal rules. Part III examines the narrative approach
to understanding contract law. Part IV looks at the internal-external;
conceptual-contextual; and descriptive-prescriptive dimensions of law
and its study. Law is often viewed as an internal, conceptual structure
that provides the rules, principles, and standards that form the rule of
law. But how law is applied—more specifically, how it can best be
applied—is an external, contextual, and prescriptive undertaking. This
Article argues that the narrative approach is at its best when it immerses
the cases in their real-world context. This Article offers some general
remarks on the practical implications of a more contextual-narrative
approach to learning law and attuning legal education to real-world
practice. Finally, Part V briefly notes that American law schools need to
present law in a global context.
One note in passing: it is clear to many, especially law firms seeking
to hire new attorneys, that legal education is in need of transformative
change. True transformative change would be the creation of a totally
new model of legal education. The German legal education system is an
example of a completely different approach. In the German legal
education system, as is the case in most European countries, law is
offered as an undergraduate degree. However, the trend is that many
students stay on for a Masters of Law and some for a Ph.D. in the law
before proceeding on to practice. The Masters and Ph.D. in the law are
not purely academic in nature, but make students more marketable.
Following graduation, students must pass a national exam. If successful,
they are then placed by the government with a law firm or government
legal office for two years of practice training. Following the two years of
practice training, students must pass a second bar exam. The idea of
making students more “marketable” has taken on added significance
after the 2008 financial crisis and the downturn in the legal job market. 5
4. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012).
5. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2051 (2010).
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The German legal education system, or the somewhat similar English
system, offers numerous insights into reforming the American legal
education system. They produce students with skill-sets and practice
experience that make them immediately productive to would-be
employers. However, the American law school model is premised on
generating three years of tuition revenues. The high costs of legal
education and the poor state of the legal job market has resulted in a
dramatic decline in law school applications. Ultimately, for law schools
to continue admitting the same class sizes they will need to lower
admission standards, but they will do that at the cost of being less
competitive in attracting quality students. The lowering of standards will
make their students less competitive in the legal marketplace, and so it
will go. The more likely scenario is that schools will maintain their
standards, which will force them to reduce class sizes. It should also lead
to a free-market competition to innovate curriculum so that law schools
can distinguish themselves as better preparing their students for legal
practice. This will be difficult given traditional mind-sets, but it is the
challenge that will be necessary to confront.
The exploration of models of legal education brings us back to the
questions posed by Karl Llewellyn, some eighty years ago, in his
infamous diatribe on American legal education, The Bramble Bush:
What a lawyer does in court, and what he does outside, what
relationship either court or lawyer has to the law, what relation
the law school has to any of these things—around these things, I
take it, there floats a pleasant haze. 6
[W]hat is the orientation of the law school with regard to the
profession? . . . Why does it offer some things and not others?
What do you need for your practice which it does not offer? 7
[H]ow does the study of the law here bear upon the work that
you will do and the life that you will live when you leave this
school and go into the practice? 8
These are the challenges law school administrators must confront. These
challenges come at a time of structural change in the legal job market;
they place law schools in a bind between the need to generate revenues
and the need for dramatic changes that would likely diminish those
revenues. Maybe radically changing legal education to include a practice
component will come from the public universities that are not quite as
6. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 11.
7. Id. at 92.
8. Id. at 11.
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dependent on tuition-only revenues. Of course, public universities’
ability to make such changes would likely be hampered by institutional
constraints, internal and external to their law schools and their
universities.
The need for “radical” change in legal education is an old storyline
going back many decades through the production of numerous studies.
As recently as 2007, the “Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching . . . concluded that our nation’s law schools are failing to
prepare graduates adequately for the practice of law.” 9 The Carnegie
Report supported the MacCrate Report 10 sponsored by the American Bar
Association some two decades earlier. The MacCrate Report
emphasized the need for enhanced skills training; the Carnegie Report
also emphasized the need for a more integrated curriculum. More
recently, proposed law school accreditation standards state that each law
school “shall identify and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve
for its students, upon graduation, competency to represent clients and to
participate effectively, ethically, and responsibly [in] the legal
profession.” 11
Law practice and legal education have been under attack for some
time, but in the years since the financial crisis of 2008 there has been a
shift from intellectual self-critique to professional survival. So change
will come slowly, 12 but it certainly will come. For now, the change will
be incremental in nature. One of those changes is the topic of the current
symposium—changing the materials used to better teach students about
law’s maddening blend of continuity and indeterminacy.
I.

INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
Looking back at some of my classes so many years ago, the hard

9. R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now,
53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1515–16 (2013) (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE
FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 12 (2007)).
10. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 259–60 (1992); see also BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
11. STANDARDS REVIEW COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, APRIL ‘13 SRC MEETING MATERIALS 73, 82–
83 (2013).
12. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is So
Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 359, 366 & n.26 (2006) (noting that the last major innovation
in legal education was the introduction of the case method towards the end of the nineteenth
century).
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Socratic method of teaching was still ingrained in the first year of law
school. But, in a number of instances, the pedagogy could not honestly
be characterized as either “hard” or Socratic. To the truly gifted teacher,
the Socratic method possesses the ability to train students to think
critically and analytically. But, for some less gifted professors, the
Socratic method devolved into using student questioning in a haphazard
way, and not as a guiding force as it was initially intended. Some
professors seemed to use it as a way of terrorizing or ridiculing students.
But does it adequately serve pedagogical objectives? I will simply repeat
what is stated above—yes, if used by a well-prepared, passionate teacher
trained in the Socratic method.
The second question relating to the Socratic method is whether it is an
efficient methodology for teaching students how to think like a lawyer.
Part of the question is answered by the above paragraph. The other part
is that done properly it is a slow device for covering material. Its value is
in the development of an analytical skill-set. The cost is much less
substantive coverage than a lecture-discussion-exercise format is able to
accomplish. In the end, the Socratic method as initially envisioned has
been dying in American law schools for decades. 13
The next tenet of traditional law school teaching is the case method—
the use of mostly appellate court decisions to illustrate the nuanced
nature of law. It makes clear that black letter law does not get one very
far when both parties cite case precedents to support diametrically
opposed arguments and outcomes. The student is introduced to the
importance of operative facts in finding precedents, whether mandatory
or persuasive, and how to distinguish a case from seemly dense case law.
This is good stuff, but the question again becomes: at what costs to other
curricular goals? R. Michael Cassidy states that “[p]roviding students
with the analytical skills necessary to ‘think like lawyers’ by teaching
them to read and dissect appellate decisions may no longer be sufficient
to meet the demands of the legal marketplace.” 14
A number of criticisms can be lodged at the traditional case method
system. First, it is questionable whether a single case or a series of cases
treated as autonomous units is the best way to impart knowledge of the
law. Second, cases severed from context provide only a narrow

13. See Christie A. Linskens, What Critiques Have Been Made of the Socratic Method in Legal
Education? The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Uses, Abuses and Beyond, 12 EUROPEAN J. L.
REFORM 340 (2010); Patricia Mell, Taking Socrates’ Pulse, MICH. B.J., May 2002, at 46 (“Today’s
Socratic method is far less robust in terms of frequency of use and severity of method than was its
predecessor of 20 or 30 years ago.”).
14. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1516.
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perspective on what internal and external elements may have impacted
the case. Internally, who were the parties? What were the arguments
given by the opposing attorneys? Were multiple legal doctrines argued
in the alternative? Externally, what was the cultural and economic milieu
of the case? Has society changed in a way that questions the correctness
of the case outcome?
This type of contextual understanding of cases requires changes in the
materials used to teach our students. The quality of a course is mostly
dependent on the quality of the instructor, but is also dependent on the
quality of the course materials. There are some very good casebooks,
many more that are mediocre, and some that are outright awful. The
awful casebooks simply string cases together, and the cases used may
not be the most illustrative or fit the flow of the other cases for the area
of law being examined; the “related materials” are spotty at best or
almost non-existent; and the case questions lack creativity or are
repeated throughout the book. Fortunately, most casebooks try to blend
cases with other materials in rational ways. However, the mix of cases
and related or explanatory materials is uneven, and the types of materials
used can vary significantly. A Washington Law Review “Contracts
Casebooks Survey” of contract law professors showed that “excessive
length” and an “insufficient number of drafting exercises or problems”
were the two most common criticisms of current casebooks. 15 Another
interesting finding is that “Personal Course Packets” were the third most
common “casebook” used among the survey participants. This indicates
a possible trend away from the extremely costly traditional casebook to a
more multi-dimensional approach to teaching beyond the case method.
The subject of contracts is an example of a subject where a narrative
approach to teaching would be beneficial. Numerous theories of contract
have been offered to explain—descriptively and normatively—the
essence of contract law. In the end, a given theory at best explains part
of contract law. Nonetheless, contract theory plays a vital role in helping
to understand contract law and how best to reform its shortcomings. The
advancement of a unitary theory of contract law, however, ignores the
complexity and multiple functions of contracts. Cunningham correctly
states that “the best way to account for the vast run of contract law
doctrine is pragmatism—a search for what is useful to facilitate
exchange transactions people should be free to pursue.”16 A pragmatic
15. Wash. Law Review, Contracts Casebooks Survey Results 8 (Spring 2013) [hereinafter Wash.
Law Review Survey Results] (on file with the Washington Law Review).
16. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 9 (citing Nate B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77 (2009)).
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contract law, and pragmatic use of contract law, is premised by a certain
degree of continuity, which a narrative approach can highlight, as well
as the importance of context to give law meaning and to allow for its
pragmatic application.
Changes in methodological approaches to teaching law will require
active engagement with faculty training opportunities. Neil Hamilton
notes, “Faculty education will be essential to help each faculty member
and the faculty as a whole to develop new curriculum and pedagogies
that address the challenge. The faculty will need a willingness to
experiment and to learn from trial and error in this new kind of
teaching.” 17 The mistake of traditional legal teaching that emphasized
the use of the Socratic method in the presentation of the legal canon was
that new professors were rarely schooled in the method and may never
have experienced the teaching of it in the proper way; it was assumed
that an intellectually gifted new hire would inherently be able to develop
the technique without any training or guidance. This mistake must be
avoided as law schools and law teachers experiment with new teaching
methodologies. It should be acknowledged that many law professors
have forsaken the Socratic method for general lecture and discussion
formats, and some have taken the more ambitious problem-solving
approach that confronts legal problems across different subject
categories, but these approaches are mostly used in upper-level courses
and seminars. The focus here is the shortcomings of current casebooks
and the teaching of the first-year courses. The next two Parts look at the
narrative power of law and the role of contextualism in modern contract
law.
II.

NARRATIVE POWER OF THE LAW

The law as storytelling and the pedagogical benefits of a narrative
approach to teaching law has been vetted in legal scholarship. 18 Robert
17. Neil Hamilton, Law-Firm Competency Models and Student Professional Success: Building on
a Foundation of Professional Formation/Professionalism 33 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13-22, 2013) (citing William D. Henderson, A Blueprint
for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 502, 505 (2013); Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, Legal
Education’s Ethical Challenge: Empirical Research on How Most Effectively to Foster Each
Student’s Professional Formation (Professionalism), 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 325, 384 (2011)),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2271410.
18. See JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002); DAVID RAY
PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW
(1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991); Jane Baron,
Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1993); Christine Metteer Lorillard, Stories
that Make the Law Free: Literature as a Bridge Between Law and the Culture in Which it Must
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Cover famously stated: “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning . . . . Once understood in the context of the narratives that
give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be
observed, but a world in which we live.” 19 A narrative approach to
teaching integrates the descriptive and normative dimensions of
law. In the words of Cover, “[True knowledge] requires that one
know not only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and
plausible states of affairs. It requires that one integrate not only the
‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the ‘what might
be.’” 20
The narrative approach, imbued with a full range of contextual
information, provides students with a better understanding of the law
and how it can best be used in advancing the interests of their clients. It
does this, to some extent, by converging the is and the ought of law. Karl
Llewellyn and the legal realists saw the “is” of real world practice—
especially in the areas of contract and commercial law—as the “ought”
of law. In framing the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn used open
textured rules, such as the reasonableness standard, to allow contextual
evidence (trade usage, business customs) to refresh and inform the rules
of commercial law with the narratives of contract law-in-action. 21 “It is
in these narratives of commercial life where the meanings of contract
rules are located.” 22 All legal and normative rules are found in the
contextual narrative that supplies them “with history and destiny,

Exist, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 251 (2005); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and
the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (arguing that legal
storytelling will make the law more empathetic to individuals and diversity in legal process);
Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990).
19. Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Article 2 uses the reasonableness standard over forty times. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2012) (providing that the written-confirmation rule requires that the
confirmation be sent “within a reasonable time”); id. § 2-201(3)(a) (providing that in order to
qualify for the specially manufactured goods exception to the statute of frauds the seller must
“reasonably indicate” that the goods in the process of manufacture are for the buyer); id. § 2206(1)(a) (providing that unless indicated otherwise in the offer, an acceptance may be sent in “any
medium reasonable in the circumstances”); id. § 2-206(2) (providing that the beginning of
performance may be a “reasonable mode” of acceptance, but an “offeror who is not notified within a
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed”); id. § 2-207(1) (providing that a statement of
acceptance must be “sent within a reasonable time”); id. § 2-209(5) (providing that a party who
waived a right under a contract “may retract the waiver by reasonable notification”).
22. Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 397, 484 (2004).
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beginning and end, explanation and purpose.” 23
Llewellyn’s “ought as is” equation noted above is subject to attack.
An astute lawyer can argue in favor of a normative alternative that exists
beyond actual commercial practice. The lawyer presents an alternative
narrative in which commercial practice is portrayed as something other
than what the law should entail—that is, the lawyer’s argument is that
the judge should interpret a legal rule or a contract based upon a vision
as to what practice should be. The lawyer argues that existing usage or
practice is actually bad or inefficient and that the court should interpret
the law in a way to encourage the development of a good commercial
practice. The conversion of the “is” of real world practice to the “ought”
of contract rules is used to determine the meaning of the parties’
agreement. However, using Cover’s concept of “what might be,” the
court can use contract law’s regulatory function—represented by such
meta-principles as good faith, commercial reasonableness, and
unconscionability—to restructure the “is” to the “what might be.” 24 The
continuing exploration and recognition of the “is” allows the rules and
principles of the law to become self-revising. However, in refreshing
rules through the recognition of modern practice, the courts at the same
time can modify the “is” through the application of an alternative
normative narrative.
In learning law and its many nuances, students also need to learn how
to apply its rules “to new contexts.” 25 These contexts include the stories
brought to the practicing lawyer by their clients. “[L]awyers practice
their craft, listening to the stories of clients, refashioning and refitting
the stories they hear (or the stories they imagine they hear) to fit the
language of the law and to accommodate what might be called the ‘law
culture’ story.” 26
Teaching a narrative view of case law better prepares students to
respond to their client stories, for it shows law as something more than
being “inert, limited, and formal.” 27 James Elkins writes:
23. Id. (quoting Cover, supra note 19, at 5).
24. Cover, supra note 19, at 10 (“To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the
precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that one
integrate not only the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but . . . the ‘what might be.’”). Another example of the
merger of “is” and “ought” is what Richard Parker refers to as “prescriptive-descriptive tenets.” See
Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory—And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 240
(1981).
25. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1520.
26. James R. Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1990); see also Leigh
Buchanan Bienen, The Law as Storyteller, 98 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1984) (book review).
27. David O. Friedrichs, Narrative Jurisprudence and Other Heresies: Legal Education at the

09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

CONTRACT STORIES

12/13/2013 2:12 PM

1297

[Law as narrative] is more than the telling or listening aspect of
the craft of lawyering that makes narrative (and the perspective
it affords us) of interest to lawyers. When we think of law as
narrative we think of law differently than we do when we
conceive of law as a system of rules or as an adversarial contest
or game. Law may indeed be a system of rules, a means of
conflict resolution, a game, a form of rhetoric and argument, or a
discourse, but it is also a vast reservoir of stories—stories about
how we use law and how we come to believe in its necessity. 28
The use of narrative or storytelling to understand law has been around
for some time. However, it is primarily seen at work as a research
methodology in areas such as feminist jurisprudence 29 and law as
interpretation. 30 Contracts in the Real World attempts to use stories from
canonic and modern cases to tell the story of law in action. 31
What are the potential benefits to this type of narrative approach to
the teaching of law? First, connecting old cases, many considered
canonical, with recent cases shows the continuity of law. In fact, the new
cases bring the old cases to life; students see their immediate relevancy
to the modern world. The instructor can explore factual differences that
may be used to distinguish the cases or to show that despite such
differences the rule or exception still holds true today.
Second, this intergenerational analysis can also be used to note the
inherent flexibility of legal concepts that have been around for centuries
but continue to find new areas of application. A few legal concepts that
come to mind include the concepts of trust and agency, and the evolution
of fiduciary duties in business organizations out of those two earlier

Margin, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 18 (1990).
28. Elkins, supra note 26, at 1.
29. See Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823 (2005); Mary
Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and
Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1991); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND.
L. REV. 1247 (1999). For an analysis of gender in casebooks, see Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985), and
Angela Fernandez, An Object Lesson in Speculation: Multiple Views of the Cathedral in Leaf v.
International Galleries, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 481, 503–14 (2008) (discussing how a case becomes
canonized in a casebook).
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Hard Cases]; Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation]; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373
(1982).
31. See Joanna Benjamin, The Narratives of Financial Law, 30 O.J.L.S. 787 (2010); Catherine
Mitchell, Narrativising Contract Law, 29 LEGAL STUD. 19 (2009).
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concepts. 32 The evolution of the internet, the creation of new types of
informational products, and the idea that the license is the product
provide other examples. These new “things” raised the question of
whether a new body of law or government regulation was needed. In the
end, except for some minor tinkering, “old” law was determined to be
adequate to facilitate and regulate these new technologies and
products. 33 For example, the ancient doctrines of trespass and nuisance
have been employed to police inappropriate use of Internet Service
Provider’s bandwidth. 34
Third, it is important to take the student’s perspective in developing
teaching methodologies—different students respond better to different
methodologies. Narrative or story-telling should be one of a number of
teaching methodologies used to reach the different learning propensities
of students. Beyond the excitement and trepidation of the first semester
of law school, the benefits of the Socratic and case method have run
their course and hopefully served the purpose of sharpening critical
32. Directors and officers are agents by the fact of being employed by the corporation. But
historically, corporate law evolved from trust law. Deborah DeMott states: “Not surprisingly, the
corporate form of business organization proved to be fertile ground for application and development
of fiduciary principles. A corporation’s directors occupy a trustee-like position . . . .” Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880
(emphasis in original); see also Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1049 (1931); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
33. The rise of electronic transactions and information products led to some attempts to create a
comprehensive law to regulate the internet and the licensing of informational products. The most
important attempt was the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2B (Licensing).
Article 2B was initially sponsored by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the two organizations that are
the traditional sponsors of the UCC and revisions to the UCC. However, NCCUSL eventually
dropped its sponsorship and Article 2B was withdrawn. The ALI tried again by drafting a model
law—Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA), but the UCITA was a failure as
Maryland and Virginia were the only states to adopt the law. See A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B
as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting—Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024 (1998) (arguing that states have managed electronic contracting well with
“few legal crashes”); Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV.
643, 643–44 (2003) (“[T]he [UCITA] has weathered the pull-out by the American Law Institute’s
contributing drafters’ concerted and well-organized efforts to contest its passage and a very cold
reception by the states.”) (footnotes omitted); Katy Hull, Note, The Overlooked Concern with the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1391, 1391–92 (2000) (arguing
that case law can adapt better to the rapidly changing technology that UCITA seeks to govern).
34. For cases that apply trespass doctrine to the internet, see eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D.
Va. 1998); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). For a discussion of applying nuisance
law to the internet, see Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 317 (2010).
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thinking skills. But something more is needed to keep students’ attention
and broaden their search for operative facts and issues. One scholar asks:
“How can law schools help to vitally engage their students and lay the
groundwork for similar vital engagement in their studies and ultimately
their law practice?” 35
If the analogy of case law’s development as a “chain novel” 36 is an
overstatement, it is at least a loose-leaf binder, organized by tabs into
different bodies or subjects of law—from general principles to
specialized bodies of rules. 37 Within each generic tab are many sub-tabs
of the individual rules, exceptions, and factors used in the application of
law to fact patterns of similarly situated cases. Common law reasoning
by its very nature is a narrative undertaking. It must look back to find
exemplary precedent—this is required for the court to demonstrate its
use of authoritative sources to bolster claims of objectivity, impartiality,
and the quality of its deductive reasoning. At the same time, the case
before the court has at least some level of particularity that separates it
from pre-existing case law. The court also must search for any such
particularity in the legal precedent. Finally, depending on the type of
particularity, the court may feel it prudent to project that particularity or
uniqueness into the future to provide guidance to future courts. The court
often poses hypotheticals to flesh out likely future developments of the
law. 38
35. R. Lisle Baker & Daniel P. Brown, On Engagement: Learning to Pay Attention 6 (Suffolk
Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 13−15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2269726.
36. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 30; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 30.
The concept of law as a chain novel depicts the law as chapters in a book with a different author for
each chapter. In a new case, a judge looks at the legal precedents as if they were chapters in a novel
and her job is to write the next chapter. The judge has some discretion as to how she writes the new
chapter, but is constrained by the storyline of the previous chapters. For example, if the earlier
chapters are in the genre of a traditional murder-mystery, the judge is not free to write a chapter
related to the genre of science fiction.
37. Robert Hillman and Nate Oman debated the benefits and costs of general and specialized
bodies of law focusing on contract law. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case
of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (2010); Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the
Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 579 (2010).
38. Karl Llewellyn listed sixty-four techniques that courts use in dealing with precedent and in
deciding cases. Two of the techniques included forward-looking reasoning based upon “prophecy”
(hypotheticals): “63. (Anticipatory): The deliberate forward-prophecy [and] 64. (Anticipatory): The
deliberate hedge via an alternative which can, on call, render the main ruling ‘mere dictum.’” KARL
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 91 (1960) (citing Harris v.
Shorall, 130 N.E. 572 (N.Y. 1921)). Neil Duxbury notes: “Common-law courts . . . recognize that
hypothetical instances can be instructive and compelling . . . .” NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 3 (2008). Courts in dicta often pose hypothetical situations that are not
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This narrative is both internal and external to the law. The
exemplarity of cited case law, as explored by the case method, exposes
law students to the conceptual nature of law in which deductive
reasoning is used to get students to think like a lawyer. The student
learns the roles of rules, standards, and principles, and under a gifted
professor, they learn the underlying rationales and public policy behind
these various legal norms. But much more has to be learned—why some
areas of law are rule-dominated and others are standard-dominated; how
a chaotic rules-based regime is sometimes replaced by a standards
regime to bring order to the chaos; how standards’ application to a wide
range of variant cases leads to the development of exceptions or a
categorization of the case law into groups of similarly situated cases,
transforming the standard into a rules-based regime; the ability to
distinguish cases on behalf of a client no matter how minute the
differences in the cases; and so forth.
The formal rules of the law are only part of the narrative enterprise.
The rules always need to be placed in the factual context of a given case.
This is the area of law application—rule to fact. Here the narrative
comes from outside of the law; in many instances, the law looks to the
real world of practice to infuse a rule with meaning or to guide the court
in applying the law to the case at bar. Commercial law, especially the
law of sales, looks to business practice—the stories of merchants and
how their businesses, industries, and associations have evolved in order
to conduct business based on elements of efficiency, certainty, trust, and
professionalism. 39
Contracts in the Real World demonstrates that the adages of contract
law mask the underlying complexity of rule application, of competing
policy considerations, and the importance of context. Two examples
from the book will be used here to show how a narrative approach
reveals the underlying elements of formal contract doctrine. The two
examples are the objective theory of contracts and the roles of the
Statute of Frauds, plain meaning rule, and parol evidence rule in contract
presented in the case. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 953, 1037 (1990).
39. Section 103(a)(2) of the UCC states that one of the UCC’s underlying purposes is “to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the
parties.” U.C.C. § 1-103 (2012). Section 202 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, entitled
“Rules in Aid of Interpretation,” states that “any course of performance . . . is given great weight in
the interpretation of the agreement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981). It
also states: “When reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties . . . [should be]
interpreted as consistent . . . with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade.” Id. § 202(5).

09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

CONTRACT STORIES

12/13/2013 2:12 PM

1301

interpretation.
Contracts in the Real World shows how a narrative structure in telling
the story of contract law can be done succinctly. In 212 pages, it weaves
old cases and sensational new ones to place contract law in its historical
context and, at the same time, make the relevancy of its rules to modern
transactions apparent to the student. Cunningham covers the traditional
topics of contract law: contract formation (gift promises vs. enforceable
contracts, invitations to offer vs. offer, acceptance, mutual assent); 40
illegal contracts (unconscionability, familial relations, gambling,
surrogacy agreements); 41 performance (express and implied terms, duty
of good faith, unanticipated circumstances, modification, accord and
satisfaction); 42 breach and substantial performance; 43 remedies
(compensatory damages, mitigation, liquidated damages, specific
performance); 44 contract interpretation, Statute of Frauds, and parol
evidence; 45 restitution and unjust enrichment; 46 third-party beneficiaries
and assignment; 47 and tortious interference. 48
In addition, Cunningham uses many of contract law’s iconic cases,
including Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico; 49 Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank; 50 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball
Co.; 51 Hadley v. Baxendale; 52 Hawkins v. McGee; 53 Hotchkiss v.
National City Bank of New York; 54 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent; 55 Krell
v. Henry; 56 Lucy v. Zehmer; 57 Marvin v. Marvin; 58 Masterson v. Sine; 59
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 11–34.
Id. at 35–58.
Id. at 148–71.
Id. at 181–82, 186–93.
Id. at 84–108.
Id. at 126–47.
Id. at 109–25.
Id. at 194–202.
Id. at 202–05.
117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
(1893) 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A.) (Eng.).
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
(1903) 2 K.B. 740 (Eng.).
84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1960).
436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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Matter of Baby M; 60 Mitchill v. Lath; 61 Newman v. Schiff; 62 Pacific Gas
v. G.W. Thomas Drayage; 63 Paradine v. Jane; 64 Parker v. Twentieth
Century Fox; 65 Peevyhouse v. Garland & Co.; 66 ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg; 67 Raffles v. Wichelhaus; 68 Sherwood v. Walker; 69 Taylor v.
Caldwell; 70 and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. 71 These older
canonical cases are woven together with modern cases, many featuring
celebrity disputants. 72 Cunningham’s stories demonstrate the continuity
and incredible flexibility that contract law brings to bear on modern
contract disputes. He demonstrates that contract law is more than mere
doctrine but is a vibrant, living law. The student is made aware of the
importance of contract law in daily practice.
In the end, the narrative approach, as a technique of teaching legal
reasoning, is captured by the terms exemplarity and typicality or atypicality. Legal philosopher Maksymilian Del Mar describes
exemplarity as follows:
[F]or the purposes of analysing legal reasoning, exemplarity is
profitably understood as a complex concept with the following
dimensions: first, typicality; second, a-typicality; and third,
modelling for the future. These dimensions can also be usefully
thought of in temporal terms: typicality is backward-looking, atypicality is present-regarding and modelling is future-oriented.
Any instance of exemplarity delicately balances these
dimensions. This is equally so for any legal reasoning process,
which must balance respect for the particularity of the present
case, with respect for relevant past decisions and respect for the

60. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
61. 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
62. 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985).
63. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
64. (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.); Alyen 26.
65. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970).
66. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
67. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
69. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
70. (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.); 3 B. & S. 826.
71. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 7, 2010). In this case, a husband and wife disputed ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers,
where there were two sets of original post-nuptial agreements—one set giving the Dodgers to the
husband, and the other set splitting ownership of the Dodgers between the husband and wife. Id.
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way in which the case might be used by future courts . . . . 73
Del Mar asserts that the best method for demonstrating the continuity
of law, at least in its idealized version, is through a narrative accounting.
Contracts in the Real World represents a general approach to teaching
law under Del Mar’s exemplarity-narrativity analysis. First, commonlaw reasoning is “full of exemplarity and narrativity,” 74 in which cases
are tied to the past (narrativity) and also distinguished from prior cases
(exemplarity). Second, such reasoning “combine[s] narrativity with
exemplarity” and by doing so creates “a temporally-organised matrix of
happenings,” 75 reaching into the past, dealing with the present, and
looking to the future, “that resonates emotionally with the audience.” 76
Narrative helps the student probe deeper into the indeterminacy of
law:
[T]he concept of exemplarity is bound to experience some
dialectical vertigo: thinking of the typicality of an example, one
cannot but help to think of its a-typicality (for why was that
sample chosen, and not another), and in thinking of its atypicality, one cannot but help to think of its normativity (for
was it not chosen not only because it is unique, but also because
it is unique in some positive way?). 77
A selection of a case for inclusion in casebook, whether universally
accepted as being canonical (e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 78 Hawkins v.
McGee, 79 and Raffles v. Wichelhaus 80) or merely as one of many cases
that could be selected, is meant to exemplify or illustrate a rule or
principle of law. At the same time, a case that is treated as an exemplar
is also unique or a-typical because in some way it stands out against the
rest. The very nature of choice also implicates a normative dimension—
the case is meant to point the student in the right direction, to provide
guidance as to how future cases should be decided. 81
73. Maksymilian Del Mar, Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition: Exploring
Williams v. Roffey 1, (Queen Mary Univ. of London, Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 139/2013, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247937.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
79. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
80. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
81. Cunningham’s discussion of a famous Cardozo decision shows the competing notions of
typicality and a-typicality. The case involved a “typical” construction contract dispute in which an
owner-buyer withholds final payment due to a defect in construction. The doctrinal answer was
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The exemplarity of a given case—its typicality and a-typicality—
allows the instructor to build a narrative structure tying the case to the
earlier cases. In any new case, the professor, lawyer, or judge seeks to tie
their arguments and opinions to an ongoing legal narrative that is at the
center of the evolution of common law rules. This is the essence of
common law reasoning. The typicality and a-typicality of cases allows
attorneys on opposing sides to cite the same case law and pose
diametrically opposed arguments: one emphasizes the case’s typicality
(mandatory precedent), while the other stresses its a-typicality
(distinguishing).
The narrative approach also allows the particularization of law’s
generality. Broad principles, vague standards, as well as fixed and openended rules, can be shown at work in the particular facts of a case. Even
more, in telling a story of the use of the principle, standard or rule in a
series of cases, the characteristics of choice, nuance, and creativity are
exposed in the law. The dialectical relationship between generality and
concreteness can be shown in telling a story beginning with the general
rule—seeing its applications to different fact scenarios, seeing the
tension of general principle or rule and novel facts, the crafting of an
application, and the creation of exceptions. It demonstrates the duality of
law to fact and fact to law—the law imposing its will on a case based
upon precedent, certainty, and predictability; the case at bar and the
particularity of its facts influence how the law should be applied and
how it should be changed.
In Contracts in the Real World, Cunningham shows the dialectical
relationship between rule and fact, and, more broadly, between law and
context. At the same time he demonstrates the ability of the narrative
approach to cover complicated areas of law with great brevity of text. In
twenty-two short pages he covers the story of the statute of frauds and
parol evidence rule, as well as their roles in contract interpretation. 82
Many of the cases used are very recent cases involving celebrities and
sensational fact patterns. The cases feature the rap artist Eminem, 83
newsman Dan Rather, 84 a case relating to the production of the Golden

clear that since the contractor had not fully performed the final payment was not yet due. Cardozo
focused on the a-typicality of the case—use of an unspecified brand of pipe of equal quality and the
lack of real damages to the owner-buyer—to fabricate the substantial performance doctrine.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 189 (discussing Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y.
1921)).
82. Id. at 126–47.
83. F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
84. Rather v. CBS Corp., 886 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
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Globe Awards, 85 the McCourts’ divorce battle that determined the fate
of the Los Angeles Dodgers, 86 country music personality Cliff Dumas, 87
Academy Award-winning actress Jane Fonda, 88 and the cosmetics icon
Elizabeth Arden. 89
Cunningham covers much ground in a little space, laying out the
classic rules of contract, as well as showing the disunity in the
application of the rules to similar fact patterns across different states. We
learn that the statute of frauds traces its origin to 1677 and that the
rationales for its invention have long passed. 90 Still, the rule requiring a
written instrument to enforce certain contracts persists to the present.91
We learn that when a writing, whether required by the statute of frauds
or not, is intended to be the final integration of the parties’ agreement,
then the parol evidence rule precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to
supplement the contract (although the word “contradict” the contract
may be a better choice).92 The judge applies the plain meaning rule to
interpret the contract unless she decides the contract is ambiguous. 93 If
the judge decides the latter, the jury decides the interpretation as a matter
of fact with the aid of extrinsic evidence presented by the parties. 94
In deciding the existence of an ambiguity, Cunningham gives the
modern standard of “whether the language is reasonably susceptible
to . . . competing interpretations . . . .” 95 However, the narrative story is a
bit incomplete. It would have been wise to advise the student of the
practicality of this standard. It provides a great deal of discretion to the
court. In the event that a “plain meaning” interpretation would lead to an
unjust or ludicrous outcome, courts will be tempted to allow extrinsic
evidence to be admitted for the court to determine if there is a reasonable

85. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 132–36 (discussing how Dick Clark Productions contested the
termination of its rights to produce the Golden Globe Awards show by claiming that the contract
provided for automatic renewals).
86. In re Marriage of McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010)
(addressing claims by a husband and a wife for ownership or shared ownership of the Los Angeles
Dodgers due to conflicting language in their postnuptial agreement).
87. Dumas v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 416 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2005).
88. Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1953).
90. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 142.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 134–35.
93. Id. at 127–29, 146.
94. Id. at 127.
95. Id.
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alternative interpretation (opposed to the plain meaning interpretation).96
If the court recognizes the plausibility of the alternative meaning, then it
can declare an ambiguity, switching the determination from one of law
to one of fact.
In regard to the Eminem case, Cunningham explains the importance
of “linguistic structure and cues” in determining whether the purchase of
downloads and ringtones were sales for which the royalty rate was fixed
at twenty percent or licenses for which Eminem would receive a royalty
rate of fifty percent. 97 Here the appellate court focused on the prefatory
language of the license provision that followed the sales provision that
stated “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing.” 98 It interpreted that to mean
that in cases of doubt the residual category was a license, and thus held
that Eminem was entitled to the fifty percent royalty rate. The moral of
the story is two-fold. First, in complex contracts legal cues, like
“notwithstanding,” are ways of signaling the more important or broader
terms. Second, the case shows the importance of “think[ing] through
plausible future scenarios” in the drafting of long-term contracts. 99
In the Rather case, the issue was conflicting terms between an original
contract and an amendment to that contract. 100 The original contract had
a “pay-or-play” clause that gave the broadcasting company the option of
paying Rather, not using his services, and not being required to release
him from the contract in order to work for another network. The
amendment indicated that if released from his news anchor position the
network was required to place him in another specified show (a removaland-reassignment clause). The court held that since the later clause was
preceded by the phrase, “except as otherwise provided in this
contract,” 101 the pay-or-play clause controlled. Cunningham implicitly
makes the point that this was a case of poor contract drafting. The
lawyer, in negotiating the amendment, should have cross-referenced the
pay-or-play clause and made sure that the removal-and-reassignment
clause was replacing the previous clause.
In the Golden Globe case, the dispute pertained to the renewal of the
right to produce the awards show. 102 The production company argued
96. Id. at 127–29, 146.
97. Id. at 129 (discussing F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
2010)).
98. Id. at 128.
99. Id. at 129.
100. Id. at 130–32 (discussing Rather v. CBS Corp., 886 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)).
101. Id. at 132.
102. Id. at 132–36.
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that the contract granted them the right to an unlimited number of
options to produce the show. The contract, meant to be a final
integration, required the court to directly interpret the meaning of the
clause and precluded it from using extrinsic evidence by the parol
evidence rule. Despite the existence of a commonly used merger clause,
the court held that a traditional principle of contract interpretation is that
individual terms are to be interpreted in the context of the contract as a
whole. The “open-ended” renewal clause was preceded by a clause that
granted the producer eight options. The court reasoned that if the second
clause granted unlimited options then there would be no reason for the
first clause’s stipulating a fixed number of options. The court also noted
that the parol evidence rule did not bar the admission of course of
performance or post-contract evidence. The facts showed the producer
always formally requested a renewal and received the express consent of
the owner of the show and thus supported the argument that the options
were not automatic or unlimited. 103
The McCourt case involved a post-nuptial agreement dividing the
couple’s property, but the agreement left unclear who was to be
allocated the ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers. 104 A number of the
original copies of the contract stipulated that the team went to the
husband, while other copies equally divided the ownership between the
husband and wife. Cunningham describes this case as one of a
“scrivener’s error” and references two older cases—the case of the
“fraudulent architect” 105 and the 1941 case of the “erroneous deed.” 106 In
the fraudulent architect case, two contracts were prepared with vastly
different contract prices. 107 However, the case was distinguishable
because the divergence was intentionally caused by the architect in order
to fraudulently induce the parties to enter the contract. The McCourt
case involved a drafting error, but no fraud. In the erroneous deed case, a
deed was drafted describing the transfer of an entire parcel of land, while
the parties had agreed on a sale of only a portion of the parcel. The court
held that the case was one of mutual mistake, and not one simply caused
by a scrivener’s error and, therefore, the normal remedy for scrivener’s
error—the remedy of reformation—was not applicable. 108 In the end, the
court in the McCourt case held that its case was also distinguishable
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 136–41.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
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from the scrivener’s error cases, since there was conflicting evidence of
what the parties actually intended. 109 Therefore, the contract was held to
be unenforceable with resolution to be decided under divorce law. 110
The notion that law is an exact science was implicitly dismissed in the
above cases that demonstrated the practice of distinguishing cases. The
Dumas case 111 notes that courts use the reasons behind rules as guides to
rule application. 112 It further illustrates the problem of applying a rule
when the reasons for the rule have run out. The classic example is the
statute of frauds, created in 1677, requiring a written instrument in
certain types of contract transactions. The Dumas case dealt with the
negotiation of a five-year employment contract via a series of e-mail
exchanges. In the end, the court held that the exchange of e-mails did not
satisfy the statute of frauds. However, this is a weak case for illustrating
the need to use “horse sense” in applying the statute because the court
held that no contract was formed due to indefiniteness, meaning that the
statute of frauds issue was irrelevant to the decision. 113
The Jane Fonda 114 and Elizabeth Arden 115 cases illustrate the lack of
unity in the area of the statute of frauds. In general, courts have loosened
the rigidity of its requirements in order to avoid dismissing meritorious
claims. However, what the statute actually requires varies across the
states. Most states do not require the agreement to be a single document,
and instead most states allow the writing and signature requirements to
be met by piecing together numerous documents. 116 However, some
states require the documents to cross-reference each other, while other
states do not. 117 Cunningham summarizes the material presented in the
109. Id. (“Testimony conflicted about [what] the couple intended . . . .”).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 141–42 (citing Dumas v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 416 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2005)).
112. Id. at 142 (“[C]ourts often look to a statute’s purpose or history.”).
113. Id. (“Judges rely instead on horse sense.”).
114. Id. at 142–44 (discussing Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988)).
115. Id. at 144–45 (discussing Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y.
1953)).
116. See U.C.C. § 2–201(1) (2012) (providing that the statute of frauds is satisfied by “some
writing”); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 784 (5th ed. 2003) (“If
there is more than one record and all of the records are signed by the party to be charged and it is
clear by their contents that they relate to the same transaction,” then the statute of frauds is satisfied;
or if all are not signed then “extrinsic evidence is admissible to help show the connection between
the documents and the assent of the party to be charged.”); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-4, 58 (2d ed. 1980) (“Presumably several writings
can be pieced together to satisfy the requirement, writings which taken alone would not be
sufficient.”).
117. PERILLO, supra note 116, at 784 (noting that in some states, if the signed document is “not
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Jane Fonda and Elizabeth Arden cases by tapping into the longstanding
debate between those arguing for formal versus contextual methods of
interpretation: “[I]t is hard to find a court that inflexibly adheres
to . . . pure literalism or pure contextualism. Both strands influence the
analysis and resolution of disputes over the meaning of words and the
scope of documents.” 118 Thus, the formalism of the rules relating to the
statute of frauds are not as formalistically applied as they were in the
past due to the shift to a contextual approach to interpretation and
application of law.
III. ASCENDANT CONTEXTUALISM: IMBUING LAW WITH
MEANING
It is repeatedly stated that we are all realists now. An equally apt
statement is that we are all contextualists now! 119 Despite the arguments
of neo-formalists, 120 law and legal reasoning is only a part of
understanding how the legal process works in fact. Karl Llewellyn noted
that in teaching law “it becomes vital in a new way to remember that the
sound quest cannot be the simple-via-the-shallow; it must drive on
despite all defeat toward the simple-via-the-deep.” 121 Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.’s oft-cited prediction theory 122 recognizes that a successful
lawyer requires something broader than just thinking like a lawyer or,
alternatively stated, that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” needs to be
more broadly understood as something beyond legal reasoning or critical
thinking. In Holmes’ words: “The object of our study, then, is
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through
attached to or does not expressly refer to the unsigned” document, then “the unsigned document is
not sufficiently authenticated” (citing Young v. McQuerrey, 508 P.2d 1051 (Haw. 1973); Hoffman
v. S.V., 628 P.2d 218 (Idaho 1981); Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1968))).
118. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 147.
119. The rise of contextual interpretation of law and legal instruments, likely accelerated by the
adoption of the UCC, has shattered the idea that contracts or statutes can ever be bastions of plain
meaning interpretation. See, e.g., Catherine Mitchell, Entire Agreement Clauses: Contracting out of
Contextualism, 22 J. CONTRACT L. 222 (2006).
120. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of
Neoformalism, 71 FORD. L. REV. 869 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Robert E. Scott, A Case for Formalism
in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000); Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
907 (2011); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
971.
121. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 8.
122. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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the instrumentality of the courts.” 123 The need to institute a more
contextualized approach to teaching law was noted in a 1914
Carnegie Foundation report “that recommended a more holistic and
contextualized approach be taken in educating lawyers and
preparing them for the practice of law.” 124 A fuller understanding of
context and its importance allows a lawyer a greater chance of
predicting what the law and the courts will do. This ability enables
the lawyer to better serve her clients.
Contracts in the Real World continuously emphasizes context in
teaching a deeper understanding of contract law and its application.
A father’s gifting of the family home and a promise to pay off the
mortgages encumbering the home in exchange for one dollar was a
legal gift (handing over the deed), but the promise to pay off the
mortgages was unenforceable because the “context of the event left
no doubt the father was giving a gift” and not entering a contract. 125
In a case involving the borrowing of money in order to escape Nazioccupied Greece, the amount of the loan was in dispute, as well as
whether the loan agreement was a forgery. The court held that the issue
of forgery was secondary given the “context” of a desperate need to
leave Greece and, therefore, mere inadequacy of the consideration did
not void the contract. 126
The above two cases illustrate that “contracting parties inhabit two
different worlds, a real one created by them and an artificial one created
by the law.” 127 Catherine Mitchell takes issue with the “two worlds”
view of parties engaging in two separate transactions—the business and
the legal transaction. She admits that law may, at times, diverge from
real world practice, leaving contract doctrines with a veneer of
“artificiality and irrelevance.” 128 However, Mitchell asserts that even
though such divergence may occur, “the connection between contractual
relationships and contract law is much more complex and nuanced than
the ‘two worlds’ idea suggests.” 129 In the end, she argues that what is
needed is a type of legal reasoning that recognizes “the operation of
123. Id. at 457.
124. DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 18 (2009).
125. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing Fischer v. Union Trust, 101 N.W. 852 (Mich.
1904)).
126. Id. at 39 (discussing Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App. 1949)).
127. Catherine Mitchell, Contracts and Contract Law: Challenging the Distinction Between the
‘Real’ and ‘Paper’ Deal, 29 O.J.L.S. 675, 676 (2009).
128. Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.
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formal contracts and relational norms as integrated phenomena.” 130
While socio-legal scholars differ over the precise implications of
relational theory for contract law and legal reasoning, most generally
agree that a contextual approach to contracts regulation is preferred over
an inflexible doctrinal method. Feinman, for example, states that
relational analysis is “contextual with a vengeance,” requiring a
pragmatic, differentiating approach depending on contract type. 131
“[C]ourts should recognize that the documents may serve a variety of
purposes depending on contractual context and the quality of the parties’
relationship.” 132
The use of relational norms in the interpretation of contracts “requires
not [just] the construction of the parties’ agreement, but the
reconstruction of it—the reassembly of its constituent parts and the
expectations and motivations, both documented and undocumented, that
helped create it.” 133 The use of relational norms in the interpretation
process, especially in long-term contracts, can be justified because it is
in the use of these norms and the contextual evidence needed to flesh
them out that a court can best determine the expectations of the parties in
the formation and performance of their contract.
What are the elements of context that influence courts and are
important to understand when learning about the law? There is no easy
answer to this question because there are many dimensions of context—
the context of the dispute (characteristics of the parties and their
transactions within a given relationship and industry); the context of the
case within a greater societal, cultural, and economic environment; and
the context of the case within pre-existing and future case law. Appellate
cases provide some of the operative facts of the case, but not a full or
complete factual accounting. The appellate opinion may touch upon
some of the external societal forces at play in a given dispute, but often
ignore many important underlying factors, such as discrimination, bias,
and stereotyping. 134 A narrative approach to teaching law provides an
opportunity to weave in these heretofore forgotten or neglected
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. Jay Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 737–38, 742
(2000).
132. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 702.
133. Id.
134. The issue of social-class bias has been examined by Miriam Cherry. See Miriam A. Cherry,
Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom: The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV.
235, 240–45 (2008) (discussing Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964); Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891)).
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contextual elements.
Many of the key facts and influences in a case are not found in
excerpted appellate court cases; they are found in the nitty-gritty of trial
court materials. This was demonstrated in a 2008 symposium dedicated
to better understanding the iconic 1917 case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 135 the seminal case in which Justice Cardozo salvaged
exclusive-agency contracts by implying a duty of best efforts on the
agent in the procurement of endorsements for its principal.136 The case
included Cardozo’s famous adage for the judicial authority to imply
terms into such a contract (and others) where the promise is “‘instinct
with an obligation,’ imperfectly expressed.” 137 Deborah Zalesne takes
issue with Cardozo’s opening characterization of Lady Duff-Gordon:
“The defendant styles herself ‘a creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a
sale.” 138 Zalesne notes that the characterization of Lady Duff-Gordon’s
“business” is somewhat frivolous in nature.139 In fact, she was a savvy
businessperson in a man’s world who helped shape the fashion world
through the mass-marketing of designer clothing. 140 The case could be
used to show the nature of stereotyping and gender bias underlying the
facts of the case or as they existed at the time of the case.
The duty of best efforts is best rationalized as being dictated by the
duty of good faith. Yet Nicholas Weiskopf notes that in researching the
New York case law he found the courts rejecting good faith as a ground
for the implication of terms. 141 Thus, the case was not the watershed
event that it could have been due to its narrow interpretation as simply
implying a given duty in a unique form of contract—the exclusiveagency contract.
Miriam Cherry’s article illustrates how the Duff-Gordon case can be

135. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
136. Symposium, The Enduring Legacy of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV.
161 (2008).
137. Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214 (citing McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1909)).
138. Id.
139. Deborah Zalesne with David Nadvorney, Integrating Academic Skills into First Year
Curricula: Using Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in Legal Reasoning,
28 PACE L. REV. 271, 290 (2008).
140. Id.
141. Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap Between Interpretation and Gap-Filling
to Achieve Minimum Decencies, 28 PACE L. REV. 219, 220 (2008) (discussing how the New York
Appellate Division reviewed the case law and in a 5–0 vote held there was not any good faith duty
in the law that would allow the court to imply a duty into a contract, such as the duty to use best
efforts).
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used to place a case within its overall social context. 142 In examining
social class, she “open[s] [an] inquiry into the distributional nature of
contract law” and encourages “students to think about issues of
economic stratification more critically.” 143 The richness of such cases or
storylines is demonstrated by Celia Taylor’s article, Teaching Ethics in
Context: Wood v. Lady, Lucy Duff-Gordon in the First Year
Curriculum, which shows how the Duff-Gordon case can be used to
teach professional ethics. 144 Finally, a further example of the narrativecontextual use of an iconic case to teach a deeper, more nuanced, and
more realistic view of law and its application is Zalesne’s demonstration
of how such cases are “ideal vehicles for explicit teaching of analytical
skills.” 145 He argues the importance of the broader use of such cases
because of the current “disconnect” between doctrinal instruction and
analytical skill training. 146
In prior scholarship, I have noted that Cardozo’s decision in DuffGordon, like most of his opinions, demonstrated his contextual mode of
interpretation. 147 His ability to use context to look outside the immediate
doctrinal formalities is what enabled him to profoundly change and
modernize American contract and tort law. I argued that the implied duty
of good faith already existed at the time of the Duff-Gordon case and
that the case’s importance was due to its use of a contextual means of
interpretation to construct the implied duty of best efforts.148 The
importance of context, and not just reading formalized law, to the actual
practice of law needs to be more fully emphasized in casebooks. The
narrative approach is one means of capturing such all-important context.
Duff-Gordon’s extension to modern developments in employment law
provides an example of the importance of context in creating a story of
law; it also shows the interconnectedness and discontinuities of law.

142. See Cherry, supra note 134.
143. James J. Fishman, The Enduring Legacy of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L.
REV. 162, 175 (2008).
144. Celia R. Taylor, Teaching Ethics in Context: Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon in the First
Year Curriculum, 28 PACE L. REV. 249, 249–50 (2008).
145. Fishman, supra note 143, at 175.
146. Id.
147. Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism, 28
PACE L. REV. 315, 340–44 (2008) (reviewing Cardozo’s use of extrinsic or contextual evidence in
interpreting contracts).
148. Id. at 318–24 (discussing the unoriginality of Cardozo’s decision in Duff-Gordon).
Cardozo’s rejection of the four-corners analysis of formalism in favor of the use of context evidence
is borne out by his assertion that “[w]e are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the
mercy of the other.” See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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Robert Bird examines the application of “instinct with an obligation” as
a rationale for extending the duty of good faith into the employment
relationship. 149 Along the same lines, Emily Gold Waldman criticizes
the New York courts for failing to extend the implied duty of good faith
into the employment context. 150 In the end, the symposium on DuffGordon shows that “[w]e should teach . . . fewer cases and do more with
the cases we teach and use other methods for conveying doctrine.” 151 Or,
as another contract law professor states: “Depth is more important than
breadth . . . . [L]earning how to extract from an opinion a coherent story
of what happened in the case and understanding how the court applied
legal doctrine to the facts . . . are far more important than obsessing
about doctrine as such.” 152
A type of legal scholarship that emphasizes the role of depth over
breadth is legal archeology. Legal archeology attempts to fill in the gaps
in the official appellate court opinion. It places a case (usually an older,
iconic one) in the context of the times. It explores evidence that was
unreported in the formal decisions and places the case in the context of
similarly situated cases. A fine example of this type of scholarship is
Debora Threedy’s Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur
Murray on Gender and Contracts. 153 Threedy weaves a narrative of the
role of gender stereotypes in one of contract law’s most iconic series of
cases—the Arthur Murray dance studio cases. 154 My first-year contract
casebooks include an Arthur Murray case used to introduce the doctrine
of undue influence. I find it interesting that some thirty-four years later
the case remains vivid in my memory. In thinking about the present
Article, the answer for this retention now seems clear—the case simply
told a good story. But, as Threedy shows, it did not tell the correct or, at
the least, the complete story. 155 A further discussion of Threedy’s
149. Robert C. Bird, An Employment Contract ‘Instinct with an Obligation’: Good Faith Costs
and Contexts, 28 PACE L. REV. 409 (2008).
150. Emily Gold Waldman, Fulfilling Lucy’s Legacy: Recognizing Implicit Good-Faith
Obligations Within Explicit Job Duties, 28 PACE L. REV. 429 (2008).
151. Wash. Law Review Survey Results, supra note 15, at 11.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender and
Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010).
154. See Staples v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 61 Cal Rptr. 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Vokes v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d
487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
155. The cases found in the casebooks depict lonely, elderly women as victims of overreaching
by male dance instructors leading them to be unduly influenced in purchasing a large number of
dance lessons. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 991 (4th ed. 2008);
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 557 (6th ed.
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analysis provides numerous insights into the law as applied and on how
it should be taught.
Threedy researched a significant number of old Arthur Murray dance
studio cases and came upon a stunning realization that a number of the
cases involved not only elderly women but also elderly men. Based upon
this realization, she analyzed the different characterizations of the
plaintiffs by the courts based on gender and, in some cases, the reaching
of different outcomes in cases of almost identical fact patterns.156
Unknown to law students, and subsequent practitioners, gender played a
key role in the application of contract doctrine in these cases. The
widowed old women were hoodwinked in buying an exorbitant number
of dance lessons. The women were victims of overreaching as the studio
used attractive male dancers to prey on the ladies’ loneliness.157
Subsequently, the women sued for a refund under the doctrines of undue
influence and misrepresentation. The courts focus on their vulnerability
and the hope to become proficient in dancing to fill a void in their lives.
In contrast, the old men were not hoodwinked because they were not
vulnerable and were getting exactly what they paid for—the touch of a
beautiful woman, or, putting it more vividly, a type of sexual
encounter. 158 Of course, the elderly women, all grandmothers, could not
possibly have had such thoughts!
Blake Morant, in his work on racial bias in the law, uses
contextualism as both a descriptive and a normative device.159 The
2007). Threedy notes, “Not all of the plaintiffs in the Arthur Murray cases are women, however.
Some of the plaintiffs are men.” Threedy, supra note 153, at 759–60.
156. Threedy sketches out the different gender narratives in which the elderly women are
“vulnerable” to overreaching and the elderly men are astute purchasers of companionship. Threedy,
supra note 153, at 761–67.
157. Threedy provides a composite story taken from two of the cases:
Lonely, vulnerable, typically elderly widow/spinster attends a dance class or demonstration at
an Arthur Murray Studio. There, an attentive, presumably attractive, young male dance
instructor “sweeps her off her feet” and in no time at all, she has signed up for hundreds, if not
thousands, of hours of dance instruction, costing her thousands, if not tens of thousands, of
dollars.
Id. at 761 (discussing Vokes, 212 So. 2d at 907–08; Syester v. Banta, 133 N.W.2d 666, 669–70
(Iowa 1965)).
158. Threedy states that the Arthur Murray Dance Studies featured “touch dancing,” which she
describes as “rhythmic movements [that] all invoke—let’s be frank here—a sexualized
experience . . . .” Id. at 767. She also asserts that “men as a class have greater access to economic
resources and thus can more easily be the consumer of companionship or sex.” Id. at 768.
159. See Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract]; Blake D. Morant, The Relevance
of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889 (1997)
[hereinafter Morant, Race and Disparity]; Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the
Regulation of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH.
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influences of bias in the law and the application of law are a descriptive
reality that can be fleshed out through an expanded contextual
analysis. 160 However, contextualism as a method to uncover illicit
factors (such as racial or gender bias) in the law is also a device for legal
reform to neutralize those factors (such as remedying biases when
interpreting a contract or recognizing acts of bad faith). Once uncovered,
law can overcome racial, gender, and other biases by formally
recognizing them as part of the contextual factors a court should weigh
in rendering its decision. James Elkins states:
Some stories imagine law as the bulwark of tradition and,
miraculously, the means by which we can free ourselves from
the shackles of history. Other stories, particularly those of
women, people of color, and those for whom the American
Dream has been a cynical lie, are also implicated in stories of
law. 161
These parallel stories are often not sufficiently told in casebooks.
Morant asserts that law can be made more objective through the
admission of more contextual evidence: “[T]he operation of contractual
rules within the reality of human conduct belie the facade of
objectivity.” 162 He then poses a positive theory of contextualism to help
make contract law true to its mission of objectivity. First, “judicial
decisions should be evaluated contextually, as well as literally, in order
to gain complete comprehension of its reasoning.” 163 Second, “[w]hile
[race, gender, and disparity] are not necessarily important in all contexts,
they should be explored whenever they conspicuously or tacitly impact
either the bargainers’ actions prior to formation, or the decisionmaker’s
adjudication of the formed bargain.” 164 The introduction of these factors
as part of judicial analysis results in an initial deconstruction of contract
law 165 by “shatter[ing] contract law’s illusion of objectivity.” 166 When
ST. L. REV. 925 [hereinafter Morant, Procedural Unconscionability]; Blake D. Morant, The
Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA.
L. REV. 63 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.].
160. See, e.g., Morant, Procedural Unconscionability, supra note 159 (contending that in order to
understand the disproportionality of power in bargains, courts must more fully scrutinize the context
of the bargain).
161. Elkins, supra note 26, at 1.
162. Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 159, at 891.
163. Id. at 893.
164. Id. at 938.
165. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 159, at 71–72 (“The
principal term here is realism—where theoretical constructs of bargaining relationships are
deconstructed to allow for more proactive measures to counter pejorative conduct.”).
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courts and substantive law openly acknowledge the influence of factors,
such as bias and discrimination in contracts, the law is able to work
towards greater objectivity and impartiality. 167 In Morant’s embrace of
contextualism, his brand of deconstruction is not to be equated with
nihilistic destruction, but as a means to mold the current structure of
contract rules to be more truthful and realistic, by broadening the scope
of acceptable contextual evidence. This broadened narrative recognizes
the impact of bargaining disparities (power) and biases (discrimination,
stereotyping) to the application of legal rules. 168
In a previous work, I argued for the benefits of using works from
other disciplines to illustrate the rationales for law, the greater context in
which the legal order operates, and the relationship between law and
society. 169 Education theorists see the use of analytical frameworks from
other disciplines as a method of teaching students to view a legal
problem or issue from “multiple fram[es].” 170 The law student, through
the use of narrative, is asked to answer questions not just from a legal
viewpoint, but from an economic or historical perspective as well. This
allows students to view the law from internal and external perspectives.
The internal view only exposes the student to the conceptual nature of
law. The external view allows the student to critically analyze the law.
The internal view trains the student to change their arguments as
evidence dictates; to remain focused on the point or issue in question;
and to deal with complex legal problems in a rational and efficient
manner. The external view trains the student to keep an open mind; take
into account the entire context of the case; look for options not internal
to the law; and be sensitive to the other party’s position. 171
The narrative approach and other interdisciplinary approaches to
understanding law and legal practice can be used to develop students’
emotional engagement and empathy—these skills are needed to better

166. Id. at 70.
167. Id. (“It also commensurately prompts discussion of methods to cure the transitional ills
resulting from those problems.”).
168. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract, supra note 159, at 4 (“The goal is not to demolish
contract rules, but to enhance their efficacy and remedial potential.”).
169. Sandra K. Miller & Larry A. DiMatteo, Law in Context: Teaching Legal Studies Through
the Lens of Extra-Legal Sources, 29 J. L. STUD. EDUC. 155 (2012).
170. Id. at 158–59 (citing William M. Sullivan, Report on the Business, Entrepreneurship, and
Liberal Learning Project of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (handout for
the Sixth Annual Liberal Education and the Disciplines Breakfast Forum) (Jan. 29, 2011), available
at http://www.aacu.org/leap/can/documents/Bill_Sullivan_Handout.pdf).
171. Id. at 160–61 (citing Robert H. Ennis, Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity:
Clarification and Needed Research, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 4, 4–10 (1989)).
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relate to clients and to understand the position of opposing parties. Judge
Posner has emphasized the importance of what he terms “good
judgment” when deciding cases that lack clear-cut solutions—it is “an
elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty,
maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human
limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality, and common sense.” 172
The narrative approach provides those “other” details of the story not
formally reported, which allows the student to better observe and
sympathize with the human and societal dimensions of a case or series of
cases. Judge John T. Noonan’s Persons and Masks of the Law warns of
the tendency of lawyers and judges to allow abstract rules of law to
obscure the human beings to whom those rules are applied. 173 Noonan
asserts that beginning with Holmes the law has been personified as a sort
of living being: “By a form of misplaced concreteness, [Holmes]
attributed to an abstraction the action of living men and
women.” 174 When that happens, the rules become masks that hide and
render irrelevant the humanity of those affected by the law. 175 The mere
indoctrination of students in the substance of the law and the art of legal
reasoning fails to develop these important skill sets.
IV. STORIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
Legal scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognized the
importance of placing American law and legal education in the context
of comparative and international legal orders. 176 Judge Merritt in the
case of In re Desilets 177 asserted that multijurisdictional practice was a

172. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 117 (2008).
173. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 6 (2002).
174. Id. at 4.
175. Noonan explains the detachment of rules from the humans for which they were created or
applied as follows:
Little or no attention is given to the persons in whose minds and in whose interaction the rules
have lived—to the persons whose difficulties have occasioned the articulation of the rule, to
the lawyers who have tried the case, to the judges who have decided it.
Id. at 6.
176. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study “Transnational” Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 97 (2011); Peter L. Strauss, Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian
Moment? Is McGill Leading the Way?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161 (2006); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for the 21st Century, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2011)
(advocating that law schools should incorporate an International Legal Analysis course into firstyear curriculum).
177. 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002).
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“quotidian” part of modern legal practice.178 R. Michael Cassidy argues
that “[l]awyers need a more panoramic view of the law to argue from
analogy for an extension or novel application of domestic law.” 179 For
example, comparative law analysis demonstrates to the student that
American legal rules are matters of choice among alternative rules.
These alternative legal choices taken by other legal systems provide a
source for advancing innovative arguments on behalf of clients and
gaining insights on how best to reform existing law.
Most recently, a Symposium entitled Building Global
Professionalism: Emerging Trends in International and Transnational
Legal Education 180 included a number of articles providing case
examples of how knowledge of international and comparative law
directly impacts legal practice.181 A 2006 issue of the Journal of Legal
Education provided a number of thought-provoking articles making the
case for incorporating transnational and comparative law in first-year
civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, and tort law. 182
From a practice point of view, international, comparative, and
transnational perspectives are needed for lawyers to properly advise
clients working in a global marketplace. 183 Students graduating with
such knowledge and perspectives will become increasingly marketable.
Law schools recognize this fact and increasingly offer upper-level
courses in international and comparative law. A few schools require
such a course as part of the first-year curriculum. 184 Although these
178. Id. at 925.
179. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1522.
180. 5 DREXEL L. REV. 285 (2013).
181. Kerstin Carlson, Found in Translation: The Value of Teaching Law as Culture, 5 DREXEL L.
REV. 407 (2013); Kath Hall, Educating Global Lawyers, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 391 (2013).
182. See Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year Civil
Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (2006); M. Stuart Madden, Integrating
Comparative Law Concepts into the First Year Curriculum: Torts, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 560 (2006);
Saqid Reza, Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430
(2006); Neil S. Siegel, Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal Perspectives in First-Year
Constitutional Law, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201 (2006).
183. Anil Kalhan, Thinking Critically About International and Transnational Legal Education, 5
DREXEL L. REV. 285, 288 (2013) (citing Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community
Through Legal Education, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 21, 30
(Jan Klabbers & Mortimer N. S. Sellers eds., 2008)).
184. See generally Anthony A. Tarr, Legal Education in a Global Context, 36 U. TOL. L. REV.
199 (2004) (arguing that law schools should develop strong international and comparative law
programs). Some law schools have taken the step of changing their first-year curricula to include
and international or comparative law course. In 2006, Harvard Law School announced that first-year
law students would be required to take “one of three specially crafted courses introducing global
legal systems”: Public International Law, International Economic Law, or Comparative Law.
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courses are beneficial, weaving foreign narratives in core courses is
needed to more effectively develop international and comparative law
perspectives in the student skill set. The core casebooks (contract, tort,
civil procedure, and so forth) need to provide international, comparative,
and transnational law and practice materials. Teachers need to embrace
these changes and proactively use them in teaching their courses. 185
The problem is that casebooks are already too long to include
comparative law materials. The answer may be the use of a narrative
approach that uses fewer cases, but provides additional contextual
materials to examine the cases in depth and allow for teaching law much
like a storyteller spins a tale. However, just providing these materials
and leaving it for the teacher to construct the stories is not very efficient.
The more radical and beneficial casebook would provide the stories that
weave together different cases from different eras to show the
development of legal rules, as well as the context and reasons behind
those developments.
CONCLUSION
This is a time of great reflection involving all facets of legal
education. This Symposium focused on one of those facets—the
traditional casebook and case method of law instruction. The stack of
appellate cases assembled by Christopher Columbus Langdell in 1871 186
rightly gave way to a more “realist” casebook beginning in earnest in the
1930s. The “related materials” vary among major casebooks, but the
template has remained relatively unchanged. It is not a novel suggestion
that it may be time for a new type of casebook. The next generation of
casebooks should, at least, partially apply a more narrative style as
exhibited by Lawrence Cunningham’s highly original book, Contracts in
the Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts and Why They Matter. 187
The case-centered focus of legal education will remain the coin of the
realm, but its presentation in a narrative format, connecting a series of
Rethinking Langdell: Historic changes in 1L curriculum set stage for new upper-level programs of
study, HARVARD LAW SCH. (Dec. 2006), www.law.harvard.edu/news/today/dec_hlt_langdell.php.
The University of Washington School of Law also provides a required first-year course entitled
Comparative and International Law Survey. See Courses 2013 – 2014: LawA508: Comparative and
International Law Survey, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF LAW (last updated Feb. 5, 2013, 8:40 AM),
http://www.law.washington.edu/CourseCatalog/Course.aspx?YR=2013&ID=A508.
185. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1523 (“Many U.S. casebooks in core subject areas are beginning to
incorporate comparative perspectives.”).
186. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871).
187. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4.
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cases back in time and setting those cases in their appropriate contexts,
should be explored.
It may be time to scrap the label of “casebook” and return to what
other disciplines simply refer to as a textbook or course pack. 188 A legal
“textbook” captures the essence of the task at hand to blend cases with
practice-focused materials and comparative and international materials.
The incorporation of the narrative approach into a new generation of law
school “textbooks” will serve a number of important substantive goals.
First, the acquisition and retention of substantive knowledge will be
enhanced. The Arthur Murray case provides an example of the learning
power of the narrative approach. 189 The narrative approach, if properly
used, can illustrate the variance between formal rules of law and law in
action. Alternatively stated, it can show how case facts and the search
for a seemingly just outcome leads to a divergence of formal from
operative rules. Finally, the narrative approach shows how the spirit of
law may be lost in the interest of doctrinal purity.
A proper narrative approach illustrates the role of context in
understanding judicial decisions. This context includes the
acknowledged context found in the judicial opinion and the “unknown”
contextual factors that likely influenced the decision, but were left
outside the recognized legal canon. The power of narrative can expand
the bracketed context of the formal text to include the range of factors
and influences not reconcilable to the view of law as objective and
impartial. It is in this deeper understanding of the realities of case
decisions that practitioners of law can determine the factors, explicit and
implicit (proper and improper), which are most predictive of a judicial
outcome. It is in that deeper knowledge that a lawyer can best frame an
argument on behalf of a client.
A good story is easier to recall than a mere memorization of formal
rules, exceptions, and legal nuance. The history of the effectiveness of
oral histories, before the advent of written memorialization, attests to the
power of the narrative approach. Stories may prove to be a more
efficient means of knowledge acquisition, thus allowing for more time to
introduce other core competency features into the curriculum, such as
problem solving, drafting, counseling and negotiation exercises in the
first-year courses. In the end, a re-tooling of the traditional law school
casebook and the introduction of additional teaching methodologies in
188. A Washington Law Review survey shows that among textbooks and other materials, the use
of “Course Packs” rated as the third most popular form of course materials used, beyond two more
popular casebooks. Wash. Law Review Survey Results, supra note 15, at 3.
189. See supra notes 153–158 and accompanying text.
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the first-year curriculum will not cure the ills of American legal
education, but they should be explored as part of the overall revamping
of how and what we teach in our law schools.

